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Adversary Proceedings in Bankruptcy:
A Sideshow
by
Douglas G. Baird & Edward R. Morrison*
Across a broad range of cases, the civil trial is disappearing. 1 In the early
1960s, about twelve percent of federal civil cases were resolved by trial; by
2002 that percentage had fallen to less than two percent. 2 This sharp decline
i;aises important questions about the quality and costs of decisionmaking in
federal district courts. After all, these courts exist to resolve cases and con,
troversies. It matters whether (and why) these disputes are resolved in or
outside the courtroom.
Marc Galanter 3 and Elizabeth Warren 4 suggest that the same thing is
happening in the bankruptcy courts and that there is likewise cause for con,
cern. They argue that adversary proceedings are the part of the bankruptcy
process that most resembles traditional civil litigation and hence the appro,
priate benchmark by which to determine whether there is a "disappearing
trial" in the bankruptcy courts. 5 They suggest that there has been a dramatic
decline in the number of adversary proceedings and that this decline, like the
decline in the number of civil trials, shows important changes are afoot. We
disagree on all counts.
Bankruptcy's adversary proceeding, while resembling the civil trial, is a
small (even trivial) part of the bankruptcy process and, over most dimensions,
tells us little about the system and how it functions. Moreover, while the
dynamics of adversary proceedings may have changed somewhat over time,
few changes are worthy of note. Those that are noteworthy, far from being
cause for concern, reinforce the basic lesson of our previous empirical work:
*University of Chicago Law School and Columbia Law School, respectively. We thank Robert Ras,
mussen and Eugene W edoff for comments on an earlier draft, Ken Klee for helpful discussions, and Reena
Kim for excellent research assistance. We are also grateful to the bankruptcy judges of the Northern
District of Illinois for permitting access to their dockets.
'Marc Galanter, 'The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and
State Courts, 1 J. EMPIR. L. STUD. 459 (2004).
2
Id. at 461.
3
Id. at 498-99.
4
Elizabeth Warren, Vanishing Trials: The New Age of American Law, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 915 (2005);
Elizabeth Warren, Vanishing 'Trials: The Ban\ruptcy Experience, 1 J. EMPIR. L. STUD. 913 (2004).
5
Galanter, supra note 1, at 498·99; Warren, Vanishing 'Trials: The New Age of American Law, supra
note 4, at 923-25.
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The modern bankruptcy process is a speedy, relatively efficient mechanism
for sorting out the problems of financially distressed consumers and
businesses. 6
In this article, we draw on our prior studies 7 of the Northern District of
Illinois to assess trends in and the importance of adversary proceedings. Sec,
tions 1 and 2 provide the necessary perspective, describing the features of
adversary proceedings generally and our dataset in particular. Using these
data, we show in Section 3 that adversary proceedings are rare in both busi,
ness and consumer cases and, apart from taking less time, have changed little
in recent years.
Section 4 asks what lessons can be learned from our data about the effi,
cacy of the bankruptcy process in consumer and business cases. There are a
few. We have seen a dramatic rise in the number of consumer bankruptcy
filings over the last decade. 8 Some have associated this rise with an increased
willingness on the part of borrowers to abuse the system.9 Changes in adver,
sary proceedings over this period give us some reason to think this is not the
case. The most important issue-indeed, for all practical purposes, the only
issue-at stake in consumer adversary proceedings is the dischargeability of
debt, and creditors are more likely to object to discharge when the debtor has
committed fraud or engaged in other bad conduct. If the rise in consumer
6
Of course, the line between business and consumer cases can never be drawn with certainty when the
debtor is an individual, and we do not pretend to have done so here. As labor economists have long
recognized, individuals in the socio-economic cohort most likely to find themselves in bankruptcy often
have income from self-employment in addition to wage income. See, e.g., Kevin Moore, Comparing the
Earnings of Employees and the Self Employed 10 (Working Paper, Oct. 14, 2004). Self-employment income
can be a trivial part of overall income and be entirely unrelated to an individual's financial distress, or it
can be the principal source of income and the entire reason for the bankruptcy. Or it can be any gradation
between the two. Any line between the two is inherently arbitrary and must be drawn taking account of
the data at hand and the purpose for which the line is being drawn. We have coded an individual in
Chapter 7 as a "business" only if the PACER spreadsheets (described in Section 2) listed an "employer
identification number" (EIN) for the debtor or if the name of the debtor was not the name of an individual.
While imperfect, this coding convention does an effective job of sorting when the focus is on adversary
proceedings. No debtor among our "consumers" had adversary proceedings for any purpose other than
contesting discharge. None was involved in adversary proceedings of the type associated with businesses,
such as transfers of land or avoidance actions.
7 Douglas G. Baird & Edward R. Morrison, Serial Entrepreneurs and Small Business Bankruptcies, 105
CowM. L. REV. 2310 (2005); Edward R. Morrison, Bankruptcy Decisionmaking: An Empirical Study of
Continuation Bias in Small Business Bankruptcies, 50 J.L. EcoN. _ (forthcoming 2007); Douglas G. Baird
et al., 'The Dynamics of Large and Small Chapter 11 Cases: An Empirical Study (Working Paper, May
2005); Douglas G. Baird, The N.ew Face of Chapter 11, 12 AM. BANKR. INSTITUTE L. REV. 69 (2004);
Douglas G. Baird & Edward R. Morrison, Bankruptcy Decision Making, 17 J. LAW, EcoN. & ORG. 356
(2001).
8
During the 1990s, "nonbusiness" filings increased over 90%, from 685,429 filings in 1990 to 1,315,751
in 1999. See Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Bankruptcy Statistics, 1987-2003 Fiscal Year Bank•
ruptcy Filings by Chapter and District, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/bnkrpctystats/FY19872003.pdf.
9
E.g., Edith H. Jones & Todd J. Zywicki, It's Time for Means-Testing, 1999 B.Y.U. L. REV. I 77, 208.
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filings is due to greater abuse of the system, adversary proceedings should
have risen over the same period. They have, in fact, fallen. That they have
declined is evidence that, far from functioning poorly, the bankruptcy system
has been functioning well and that abuse is not on the rise.
In business cases, trends in adversary proceedings point to a complicated
tradeoff. A principal goal of a Chapter 11 case is to identify businesses that
are worth saving and those that should be liquidated. The bankruptcy process performs this "filtering" function well. 10 Non viable businesses are shut
down quickly; the rest leave bankruptcy and compete effectively. The effec,
tiveness of the Chapter 11 process reflects, in part, the decision of the Code's
drafters to allow existing managers to continue running their business (as a
"debtor in possession") during the reorganization process. Small businesses
frequently cannot survive without their old owner-managers. A review of
adversary proceedings shows, however, that allowing the old managers to
remain in place comes at a cost. The old managers rarely bring preference or
fraudulent transfer actions and, in small cases, there is no one else to bring
them because creditors' committees rarely become active. Hence we see the
underenforcement of preference and fraudulent transfer actions in small busi,
ness reorganizations. We do not think that this trade-off is necessarily bad.
A focus on the adversary proceeding, however, does show how this trade-off
is in fact being made.
Aside from these lessons, however, statistics on adversary proceedings
tell us precious little about the quality of the bankruptcy process. The vast
majority of cases generate not a single adversary, which means that adversary
proceedings have no bearing on the core issues in the typical bankruptcy
case-fresh start for the consumer debtor, respect for absolute priority, reha,
bilitation of the distressed business, etc. For anyone interested in evaluating
the bankruptcy process, then, adversary proceedings are a sideshow.

I. THE NARROW DOMAIN OF ADVERSARY PROCEEDINGS
In federal civil courts, every complaint, motion, deposition, or other ac,
tion is pursued with an eye toward trial. The case will typically end with a
trial or a substitute for trial, such as a settlement. Not so in bankruptcy
court. The primary goal is not settlement of a dispute. In consumer bank,
ruptcy cases, it is the fresh start, coupled with the equitable distribution of
any nonexempt assets. In corporate bankruptcy cases, the goal is reorganiza,
tion or, failing that, efficient liquidation. Both goals can be and usually are
achieved without any trial whatsoever. Indeed, the very purpose of the
bankruptcy process is often to substitute a speedy and structured bargaining
process for what otherwise would have been drawn-out civil litigation in
10

See Morrison, supra note 7.
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state and federal courts. 11
The rules governing adversary proceedings were drafted with these bank,
ruptcy goals in mind. Bankruptcy Rule 7001 defines an "'adversary proceed,
ing" narrowly to include ten types of proceedings.12 The vast majority,
however, are of two sorts. An adversary proceeding can be brought to re,
cover money or property (e.g., voidable preferences an9 fraudulent trans,
fers ). 13 It can also be brought to determine the dischargeability of a debt, to
object to or revoke a discharge, or to revoke an order confirming a plan of
reorganization. 14 These issues constitute only a tiny fraction of the tasks per,
formed in the typical bankruptcy case.
In every consumer bankruptcy, the debtor will file schedules, meet with
creditors and the trustee outside the presence of the judge, and turn over
nonexempt assets to be distributed to her creditors. For none of these tasks
is an adversary proceeding or anything resembling tradition civil litigation
either necessary or appropriate. The vast majority of consumers who file for
bankruptcy never appear in a courtroom-and there is no reason why they
should. When an individual's right to a fresh start is in dispute, a judge must
make a decision. But even here what corresponds closely to a trial is not
necessarily an adversary proceeding. Indeed, perhaps the most momentous
decision in any consumer bankruptcy case is the decision by the United
States trustee 15 to seek dismissal of the entire Chapter 7 case under § 707(6)
on the ground that the debtor is abusing the system. 16 The court holds a
hearing in such instances, but this hearing is on a simple motion, not an "ad,
versary proceeding" under Rule 7001.17 The new bankruptcy law 18 rewrites
§ 707(6) and may dramatically increase the number of "abuse" hearings, but it
will have no effect on the number of adversary proceedings.
A similar story can be told about corporate bankruptcies. By design, most
of the action takes place outside the courtroom. The drafters of the Bank,
ruptcy Code structured it to favor bargaining over litigation. 19 Moreover, the
key events in every corporate Chapter 11 case that do require judicial atten,
tion-valuation of disputed claims, approval of a disclosure statement, voting
nsee, e.g., THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW Ch. 1 (1986).
FED. R. BANKR. PROC. 7001.
13
R. 7001(1).
14
R. 7001(4)-(6).
15
0r a creditor under BAPCPA.
16
11 U.S.C. § 707(6).
17
FED. R. BANKR. PRoc. 1017(e).
18
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Title I, Pub. L. No. 109-8,
119 Stat. 23 (2005).
19
See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, Ban~ruptcy Policyma~ing in an Imperfect World, 92 M1cH. L. REV. 336,
348 (1993); Philippe Aghion, Oliver Hart & John Moore, Improving Banl{l,.lptcy Procedure, 72 WASH. U.
L. Q. 849, 857-61 (1994); JACKSON, supra note 1 I, at Chs. 1, 9.
12
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on a plan-are unlike traditional civil litigation and generate no adversary
proceedings.
The typical bankruptcy case, then, is markedly different from civil litigation and the aspects of a bankruptcy case that do resemble litigation correspond imperfectly to adversary proceedings. Moreover, as we will see in the
next section, adversaries are exceedingly rare. The overwhelming majority of
cases-business and consumer-generate no adversary proceedings whatsoever. And we would expect adversaries to become even more unusual over
time. During a period of relative stability in the law, such as we have seen
over the past fifteen years, 20 we would expect the law to become more predictable. With greater predictability, fewer adversary proceedings should be
brought and those that are brought should be more likely to succeed, implying in turn that the likelihood of settlement should rise (a defendant will
rarely insist on trial when it is clear that the plaintiff will win). 21 Far from
being a cause for concern, then, a decline in adversary proceedings may suggest that the system is becoming more predictable. In any event, focusing on
adversary proceedings to assess how well the system is functioning is a mis,
take; adversaries are a sideshow. As we show in the next section, all the
available empirical investigation strongly reinforces these observations.
II. DATA ON ADVERSARY PROCEEDINGS
Those who have voiced concern about the decline in the number of adversary proceedings and the number that are litigated have used aggregate
data. These data, however, say nothing about what happens in the typical
case. In particular, they mask their most salient feature-that the overwhelming majority of adversary proceedings are concentrated in a tiny minority of the cases.
To understand the role adversary proceedings play, we need to look at
discrete cases. To do this, we examine in detail adversary proceedings in one
particular bankruptcy court, the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, whose jurisdiction encompasses Chicago, Cook County, and outlying
areas-a large and diverse economy. As we have shown in earlier work, the
filings in this jurisdiction are similar to those filed throughout the nation. 22
20
Since 1994, there have been no significant amendments to the Bankruptcy Code. See, e.g., Elizabeth
Warren & Jay Westbrook, Contracting Out of Ban/truptcy: An Empirical Intervention, 118 HARV. L. REV.
1197, 1254 (2005) (~The current bankruptcy system is universal and highly predictable. Most commercial
lawyers can give a good account of the likely fate of various transactional structures in case of bankruptcy,
and their clients can price their risks accordingly.").
21
Priest makes a similar point about law generally: over time, experience with a legal regime increases,
uncertainty over its operation declines, and the incentive to settle disputes increases. George L. Priest,
Measuring Legal Change, 3 J. L. EcoN. & ORG. 193, 201-02 (1987).
22
Morrison, supra note 7, at (manuscript at 9-11, on file with authors).
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We gathered information about adversary proceedings using the North,
em District's PACER database, which provides access to the docket and
filings in every bankruptcy case since January 1998.23 Importantly, PACER
can also generate spreadsheets containing basic information-chapter, debtor
name, docket number, etc.-about all bankruptcy cases and all adversary pro,
ceedings since 1993. 24 Focusing on 1998, we merged PACER's data on ad,
versary proceedings with its data on case filings and then supplemented the
merged data with information from the docket sheets. In this way, we assem,
bled a dataset containing information about debtors and adversary proceed,
ings in all Chapter 11 cases, all Chapter 7 cases that bore indicia of being
business,related, 25 and random samples of 150 consumer Chapter 7 cases and
150 Chapter 13 cases. Table 1 presents the number of filings and adversary
proceedings associated with each case type. The table breaks out Chapter 11
real estate cases involving partnerships. As our analysis below shows, these
cases have distinctive features that make their adversary proceedings some,
what different.
III. A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON ADVERSARY PROCEEDINGS
A.

OVERALL INCIDENCE

A casual glance at the aggregate data might suggest that adversary pro,
ceedings are rare in consumer bankruptcies, but fairly common in business
bankruptcies. Data from the Administrative Office, for example, show that
the incidence of adversary proceedings (total proceedings divided by total
filings, expressed as a percentage) was about 3% in consumer cases but 60%
in business cases in 1998. 26 We find similar percentages (2. 7% and 56.6%,
respectively) for business and consumer cases in the Northern District, as
shown in Table I. 2 7
These percentages, however; are extremely misleading. Adversary pro,
ceedings are not evenly distributed across all filings. If we account for the
skewed distribution of proceedings-by looking at the number of cases with
at least one adversary-we find that adversary proceedings are very much
the exception in both consumer and business cases.
The distribution of adversary proceedings within the population of bank,
ruptcy filings is not skewed in consumer cases. The percentage of cases with
23

Data used in this paper are available at https:/ /ecf.ilnb.uscourts.gov/.
Limited data are available for years before 1993.
25
As noted above, supra note 6, we have adopted the following convention for sorting between busi,
ness and consumer cases. A Chapter 7 case is coded as a "business" case if the PACER spreadsheets listed
an ·employer identification number" (EIN) for the debtor or if the name of the debtor was not the name of
an individual.
26
Warren, Vanishing 'Trials: 'The New Age of Amen"can Law, supra note 4, at 938-39 figs. 13-14.
27
Note, however, that we use a different definition of "business" filing. See note 6 supra.
24
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Table 1
Sample Size: Case Types and Frequencies
Number of
Cases
Business cases
Corporate Chapter 11
Individual Chapter 11
Real estate Chapter 11
Corporate Chapter 7
Non-corporate Chapter 7
Total
Consumer cases
Chapter 7
Chapter 13
Total ·

Number of
Adversary
Proceedings

Incidence
(adversaries/
cases, in %2

130
20

122
41
12
318
28
521

136
4
295

106.6%
48.8%
41.7%
42.8%
14.3%
56.6%

150
150
300

8
0
8

5.3%
0.0%
2.7%

5

at least one adversary is equal to the overall incidence of adversaries. We
find adversary proceedings in only 5% of Chapter 7 filings and in none of the
Chapter 13 filings.
Business cases are another story, as Table 2 illustrates. Whereas the
overall incidence is about 57%, we find adversary proceedings in only 12% of
the cases and, more strikingly, nearly half of all adversaries are clustered
within only four cases. Put differently, fewer than 1% of all business filings
account for over 50% of all adversary proceedings. The picture is more strik,
ing when we focus on corporate Chapter 11 filings, where three casesabout 2.5% of all filings-account for 70% of all adversary proceedings. A
similar story is presented by corporate Chapter 7 filings. These skewed dis,
tributions are not an artifact of the year 1998 or the Northern District. In
1997, for example, one case (the bankruptcy filing of law firm Keck, Mahin &
Cate) accounted for over 15% of all adversary proceedings-business and
consumer-in the Northern District. And, as Warren notes, in 1992 a single
case accounted for nearly 30,000 adversaries-about 30% of all adversary
proceedings for the entire country. 28
Adversary proceedings, then, are rare. They are in fact altqgether absent
in the typical bankruptcy case involving a corporate debtor seeking to reorganize. For the mainstream cases, trends in the average number of adversary
proceedings are simply irrelevant. They are a sideshow. There are not and
have never been adversary proceedings-nor indeed anyth1ng that resembles
traditional civil litigation-in the ordinary case.
28

Warren, Vanishing Trials: The New Age of American Law, supra note 4, at 926 n.30.
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Table 2
Incidence and Clustering of Adversary Proceedings Across Different Case Types
Incidence
adversaries/cases,
in%

~
t"I:l
:,::,

% cases with at

% adversaries

% adversaries

least one
adversari

clustered in three
cases

clustered in four
cases

Business Cases:
Corporate Chapter 11
15.6
106.6
Individual Chapter 11
29.3
48.8
Real Estate Chapter 11
41.7
41.7
Corporate Chapter 7
42.8
7.6
Non-corporate Chapter 7
14.3
10.7
All cases
12.1
56.6
Consumer Cases:
Chapter 7
5.4
5.4
Chapter 13
0.0
0.0
All cases
2.7
2.7
Note: percentages are omitted for some categories because the number of proceedings is very small (20 or

70.0

79.2

--

0

~

~
:,::,
C
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~
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58.1

65.4

43.1

48.5
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smaller) and renders percentages misleading.
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SUBJECT MATTER

Our data allow us to look beyond the incidence of adversary proceedings
and focus on the features of the adversaries themselves. A simple picture
emerges: adversaries typically involve a very narrow range of issues. As Table
3 illustrates, in our sample only one issue-the dischargeability of a particular
debt, such as a student loan or a debt incurred through false pretenses-is
ever raised in adversary proceedings in consumer cases. 29 In business cases,
t·wo issues-voidable preferences and fraudulent transfers-constitute nearly
80% of all adversary proceedings. Voidable preferences alone account for
more than 80% of the adversary proceedings in corporate Chapter 11 cases. 30
In corporate Chapter 7 cases, adversaries are split between voidable prefer,
ences and fraudulent transfers. This likely reflects the presence of a trustee,
who manages the debtor's estate once it enters bankruptcy. 31 As we explain
in more detail below, trustees are far more likely than debtors in possession
to be vigorous in uncovering fraud (intentional or constructive).
The patterns of Table 3 go a long way toward explaining why some kinds
of cases-Chapter 1 ls filed by individuals or real estate businesses and Chapter lls resulting in confirmation or conversion to Chapter 7----,generate more
adversary proceedings than others. Consider, first, individual Chapter 11 fil,
ings. Here, the individual's fresh start as well as the future of her business are
at stake. Individual Chapter 1 ls simultaneously address the future of a busi,
ness and the future of a person (the owner-manager). Naturally, then, adver,
sary proceedings generated by these cases involve issues typically associated
with consumer bankruptcies (nondischargeability actions) as well as those
associated with business bankruptcies (preference actions). More impor,
tantly, the profile of the person likely to file an individual Chapter 11 peti,
tion is radically different from that of the person likely to file for Chapter 7.

29
1n our sample of 150 consumer cases, only eight adversaries were filed-two by debtors (seeking
discharge of student loans and tax debts) and six by creditors. A larger sample would likely yield a few
instances of other adversary proceedings in consumer cases, in particular ones involving a sale of real
property under § 363(h) and avoidance actions. Anecdotally, the latter often involve fraudulent transfers
and angry ex-spouses.
30
Outside of corporate Chapter 11 cases, we see slightly more variety in proceedings, with dis,
chargeability issues (naturally) more frequent in individual Chapter 11 cases and with disputes over priority (usually mortgage interests) and contractual liability in real estate cases.
31

1l

u.s.c.

§§ 701,702.
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Table 3
Characteristics of Adversary Proceedings, by Case Type (%)

t'I1

~

0

Avoiding
ereferences
Business cases
Corporate Chapter 11
Individual Chapter 11
Real Estate Chapter 11
Corporate Chapter 7
Non-corporate Chapter 7
All cases
Consumer cases
Chapter 7
ChaE_ter 13

Avoiding
fraudulent
transfers

Contesting
dischargeabilit}'.:

Disputing
claim
erioriti

Selling
assets

Disputing
contract

>
z
to

~

:::-::
83.1
20.0
0.0
41.9
0.0
57.3

0.8
0.0
0.0
44.1
0.0
20.7

0.0
0.0

0.0
0.0

0.0
45.0
0.0
1,532
100.0
5.1
100.0
0.0

1.5
15.0
20.0
1.5
0.0
2.7

0.0
0.0
20.0
0.0
0.0
0.3

5.4
10.0
20.0

0.0
0.0

0.0
0.0

0.0
0.0

~

C

'"O
>-}

2.2

0

0.0
4.4

r

>-<:

>

~
._
0
C

~

>

r

32

Such an adversary proceeding is, of course, frivolous, as corporations are not entitled to a discharge in Chapter 7. But nothing prevents such complaints from being filed,
and hence they appear in our data.

<
?
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The median Chapter 7 filer is a lower-middle class person fallen on hard
times. 33 The Chapter 11 individual filer is an entrepreneur who, in many
cases, engages in multiple business transactions (including real estate deals)
over the course of her lifetime and often has a number going on at any one
time. 34 The two debtors also incur different types of debt. A self-employed
entrepreneur, for example, is much more likely to have significant unpaid IRS
obligations than the typical Chapter 7 debtor, who is not self-employed and
for whom income taxes are withheld automatically. 35 These factors make it
more attractive to bring a proceeding to deny discharge in an individual
Chapter 11 case, holding all else equal. In addition, their more complicated
financial lives also make an adversary proceeding more likely, especially with
respect to real property. Sales of real property under § 363(h), for example,
require an adversary pi-o<;eeding, as do disputes involving liens on real prop,
erty and disputes between joint owners of real property.
Similar observations can be made about real estate Chapter l ls, although
our analysis must be tentative given the small sample size here (twelve filings
and five adversary proceedings). Not only do they raise numerous business,
related issues (reorganizing a business, disentangling the affairs of a partner,
ship), they also raise unique property-related issues. We also see frequent
disputes over the priority of liens and the terms of contracts, typically con,
tracts involving the sale of real estate.
Table 4
Adversary Proceedings in Corporate Chapter 11 Cases, By Outcome

Outcome
Confirmation
Conversion to Chapter 7
Dismissal
All outcomes

Number of
cases
31
24
67
122

Number of
adversaries
106
20
4
130

Cases with at
least one
adversari
29.0%
25.0%
6.0%
15.6%

The patterns within corporate Chapter 11 cases are more interesting. Ta,
ble 4 shows that adversaries are far more common in cases ending in confir,
mation of a plan of reorganization (30%) or conversion to Chapter 7 (26%)
than in dismissal (6% ). Adversaries are more common in Chapter 11 cases
33

See. e.g., Elizabeth Warren, BanJi.rupt Children, 86 Minn. L. Rev. 1003, 1005-06 (2002); TERESA A.
SULLIVAN ET AL., THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT 27-59 (2000).
34
See Baird & Morrison, supra note 7, for evidence of this "serial entrepreneurship" phenomenon.
35
As noted above, some Chapter 7 consumer debtors are, given our coding convention, self-employed.
Our point here is merely that the typical Chapter 7 consumer debtor is not.
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converted to Chapter 7 than they are in business cases that begin in Chapter
7 in the first instance. 36 This pattern is likely an artifact of speedy judicial
decisionmaking in Chapter 11: Bankruptcy judges usually know within a few
months that a business will not be able to reorganize successfully and dismiss
the case before any preference action is brought. 3 7 If, however, potential pref,
erence actions exist, the bankruptcy judge will convert the case to Chapter 7
rather than dismiss it outright. Cases that are conv ::rted from Chapter 11 to
Chapter 7 tend to be those of substantial businesses where the potential for a
successful preference action exists. By contrast, businesses that file Chapter 7
cases initially have little in the way of assets. Moreover, in corporate Chapter 7 cases as well as in corporate Chapter l ls, the debtor is required to
report, as part of its Statement of Financial Affairs, any transfers made to
insiders within a year of the petition. 38 A trustee, at least in Chicago, is likely
to investigate such transfers and to bring an avoidance action if it bears the
indicia of a fraudulent transfer. The prospect of such scrutiny is a disincentive for filing a corporate Chapter 7 initially. 39 Scrutiny by the U.S. Trustee
may also dampen corporate Chapter 11 filings, but Chapter 11 holds the
prospect of greater benefits for the old owners of the business that can offset
this risk. 40
Table 5
Characteristics of Adversary Proceedings, by Case Type (%)

Business Cases
Corporate Chapter 11
Individual Chapter 11
Real Estate Chapter 11
Corporate Chapter 7
Non-corporate Chapter 7
All cases
Consumer cases
Chapter 7
Chapter 13

Initiated by
debtor

Initiated
by creditor
or trustee

14.6
55.0
60.0
0.0
0.0
11.2

85.4
45.0
40.0
100.0
100.0
88.8

25.0
0.0

75.0
0.0

36
Table 2 shows that the incidence of proceedings in business Chapter 7 cases (about 7%) is less than
half the incidence in other business cases (for example, about 15% in corporate Chapter 11 cases).
' 7See Morrison, supra note 7.
38
See, e.g., the annotated Statement of Financial Affairs available at <http:/ /www.usdoj.gov/ust/rl9/
colorado/documents/AnntdStatement_Schedules.pdC> (visited July 6, 2005).
39
lnterview with Karen Porter of The Law Offices of Karen J. Porter, Chicago, IL (Oct. 29, 2004).
40
See Baird & Morrison, supra note 7, at 2349-65.
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The patterns in Tables 3 through 5 also explain why most of the adversary proceedings in business cases are concentrated in a handful of cases.
These cases usually involve relatively large businesses in which a creditors'
committee is active. 41 In cases involving small businesses, too little is usually
at stake to justify either the formation of a creditors' committee or the pursuit of prepetition transfers. Indeed, if the prepetition transfers are small
enough the adversaries must be brought in the district where the defendant
resides. 42 More importantly, the debtor in possession trying to keep its business alive usually has little incentive to bring a preference action against the
typical recipient of a voidable preference, such as a crucial supplier paid out of
the ordinary course on the eve of the debtor's bankruptcy filing. And if there
is no active creditors' committee (and in the typical small business Chapter
11 there is not), no o".le has an incentive to take action. The beneficiaries of
an adversary proceeding- trade creditors and other creditors with small
claims-have little to gain. The party bringing the action, however, has
much to lose (it bears litigation costs if it loses and must share any recovery
with all unsecured creditors, thanks to Moore v. Bay43 ). As Table 5 shows,
the vast majority of adversaries (i.e., preference actions) in Chapter 11 are
brought by the trustee or creditors, usually a creditors' committee, not by the
debtor in possession.
In a large case, by contrast, an active creditors committee is likely to exist
and funds are often available to pay for the litigation. Moreover, it is much
cheaper to initiate an adversary proceeding than to defend against one.
Much of the action involves affirmative defenses (such as the payment being
made in ordinary course 44 ) that impose burdens on the defendant. Each defendant must hire its own lawyer, someone who would not otherwise be in the
bankruptcy court. By contrast, the creditors' committee will already have a
lawyer who is appearing in the bankruptcy court. And each adversary proceeding typically raises similar (often identical) allegations; once the lawyer
has drafted one complaint, it is. cheap to draft new ones. In short, a case
needs to be large enough before a preference action makes sense, but once this
threshold is crossed, it usually makes sense to bring multiple actions.
A typical example of how preference actions (and hence adversary proceedings) tend to proliferate in cases above a certain size is Andriana Furs, 45
41
The person bringing the preference action in Chapter 11 is so rarely a trustee or the debtor in
possession that it underscores cases such as In re Cybergenics Corp., 226 F.3d 237 (3d Cir. 2000), which
raise the question of whether anyone other than the trustee or debtor in possession can bring avoidance .
actions. Were a court to find that only the trustee or debtor in possession could bring preference actions,
the dynamics of prefere.1ce litigation in Chapter 11 would change dramatically.
42
See 28 U.S.C. § 1409(6).
43
Moore v. Bay, 284 U.S. 4 (1931).
44
11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2).
45
/n re Andriana Furs, Inc., No. 98-4715 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Feb. 17, 1998):
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a large fur retailer with multiple locations throughout Chicago, including one
on the Magnificent Mile. After its plan of reorganization was confirmed, a
creditors' trust was formed 46 for the purpose of bringing over forty-five virtually identical 47 adversary proceedings against suppliers who received voidable
preferences. In some adversaries, the complaint named dozens of defendants. 48
This case follows a standard pattern. The preference actions are completely separate from the reorganization of the business. The plan puts the
preference actions in a trust and provides for the distribution of any proceeds.
Through this technique, the preference litigation takes place after the plan is
confirmed and after the business leaves bankruptcy.

C.

TIME TRENDS

So far, we have identified patterns in cases filed at a particular moment in
time, the year 1998. There is little reason, however, to think that different
patterns would characterize cases filed in any other year during the past dec,
ade. Indeed, the drafters of the Bankruptcy Rules predicted precisely these
patterns. 49 When we do look at national data from 1993 to 2002, we see
remarkably little variation. 50
In business cases, total adversary proceedings in business cases, expressed
as a percentage of business filings, have dropped modestly from about 70% in
1993 to just over 65% in 2002. The percentage of adversary proceedings
that terminate during or after trial 51 fell from about 7% to about 3%, but this
change was to be expected. Preference law was altogether refashioned in
46

Disclosure Statement at 3-4.
All 45 complaints seek "avoidance and recovery of preferences." Only the names of the defendants
vary. Twelve were filed on August 17, 1999; another 33 were filed between February 16 and 23, 2000.
48
See, e.g., Complaint for Avoidance and Recovery of Preferences, Creditor Trust of the Estate of
Andriana Furs, Inc. v. KDAF,TV (In re Andriana Furs, Inc.), No. 00-221 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Feb. 16, 2000)
(naming 29 defendants).
49
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States,
Suggested Interim Bankruptcy Rules, Rule 7001, 82 F.R.D. 487 (1979) ("[A] very high percentage of the
actions which will be brought under the new jurisdictional grant will b!! to recover money or property").
50
Data are available for adversary proceedings as far back as 1985, but we are skeptical that much can
be gleaned. Bankruptcy practice was still taking shape in the decade or so after the enactment of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act and the fall-out from Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,
458 U.S. 50 (1982). Consider, for example, the data on adversary proceedings in business cases. Between
1985 and 2002, adversaries (expressed, again, as a percentage of total business filings) rose substantially,
from 40% to over 65%. But, as Warren's plot of the data reveals, the pre-1993 data are substantially
different from the post-1993 data. Warren, Vanishing Trials: The N.ew Age of American Law, supra note
4, at 938 fig. 13. From 1985 to 1992, adversaries remained fairly constant, hovering around 40%. Suddenly,
in 1993, adversaries shot up to 70%. Since then, they have generally hovered between 60% and 70%. This
pattern offers compelling reason for focusing on the 1993-2002 period. This 10-year period has a further
advantage in that we can use the richer data from the Northern District as a benchmark. (For Northern
District data, PACER files are complete only after 1992.)
"Warren, Vanishing Trials: The N_ew Age of American Law, supra note 4, at 940 fig. 16.
47
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1979 and substantially reformed in 1984. 52 Open issues continued to be liti,
gated for several years and it took time for practices to become stable. As
issues to litigate have disappeared and predictability increased, the amount of
litigation should decline and it has.
For consumer cases, the national data again show little variation over
time. Adversary proceedings (expressed again as a percentage of total con,
sumer filings) fell, from about 4% during the early 1990s to about 2.5% in
2002. But the overall incidence of adversary proceedings is so low that we
question whether much can be made of this drop. 53 The same can be said for
adversary proceedings terminating during or after trial. As a percentage of
cases filed, they fell from about .55% in 1993 to about .25% in 2002. That is
a 55% decline, but it is also a reduction of only .3 percentage points in abso,
lute terms-a drop of only 130 cases. This number is vanishingly small rela,
tive to the total number of adversary proceedings filed in consumer cases.
Such a small change could reflect a slight shift in the composition of debtors,
in the kinds of debts they held, or in the U.S. Trustee's enforcement policy. 54
Figure 1: Frequency and Resolution of Adversary Proceedings, 1993-2002
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52
1n particular, before 1984 the ordinary course defense to preference actions applied only to debts
incurred within 45 days of the petition. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2), amended by the Bankruptcy Amendments
and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 462(c), 98 Stat. 333, 378. The effect of the
change was to decrease the number of transfers that were preferences, but to increase the arrearage cost of
litigating a preference action, as more preference actions would turn on whether a payment was made in
ordinary course, a question that is necessarily fact dense.
53
A reduction from 4% to 2.5% is a large change in percentage terms (a 38% drop) but a very small
change in absolute terms (a drop of only 1.5 percentage points).
54
If the trustee, for example, became slightly more aggressive in bringing § 707(6) motions for substantial abuse (which are not adversary proceedings) during this period, a few creditors who otherwise would
have brought independent adversary proceedings to contest the dischargeability of particular debts would
not have needed to do so.
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The absence of meaningful time trends is evident in the Northern District
data as well. Here we draw on PACER spreadsheets for the period 19932002. Figure 1, for example, shows that the volume of adversary proceedings,
expressed as a percentage of total bankruptcy filings, was about 6% in 1993,
fell to about 3% in the late 1990s, and recently jumped back up to about 8%.
Over a ten-year period, then, little has changed in the rate with which adver,
sary proceedings are filed. The same is true for the percentage of cases re,
solved by trial. Figure 1 shows that this percentage has fallen by over 50%,
from 4.7% in 1993 to 1.6% in 2002. This parallels the drop in the national
data, and the same caveat applies: a drop of only 3.1 percentage points may
reflect only a small cha.:1ge in the way the docket as a whole is managed.
Figure 2: Average Duration of Adversary Proceedings, 1993-2002
12.00 ·
10.00 ·

Cl)

8.00

C
0

6.00

s::

:a:

4.00
2.00
0.00 ·
1993

1995

1997

1999

2001

Year Adversary Commenced

There is one change over the last decade that may be of some moment.
Adversary proceedings take less time to resolve. As Figure 2 illustrates, the
average length of an adversary proceeding from time of filing until resolution
has fallen by over 25%, from about ten months in 1993 to about 7.5 months
in 2002. The average duration even dipped below six months in 2000.
These statistics might be viewed as evidence of undue haste in the bank,
ruptcy courts. After all, six months is a blink of the eye for ordinary civil
litigation. But it would be a mistake to reach this conclusion. Six months is
an eternity in bankruptcy court. Even in corporate Chapter 11 cases, nearly
45% of all dismissals and conversions occur within the first three months. 55
That adversary proceedings are becoming shorter is merely additional evi,
dence that bankruptcy judges are managing their dockets effectively.

55

See Morrison, supra note 7, (manuscript at 13-14, on file with authors).
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IV. INTERPRETING THE EMPIRICAL PATTERNS
The absence of trials is neither good nor bad in the abstract. To interpret
the patterns observed here, we must ask whether current practice-including
the absence of traditional litigation-advances the goals of bankruptcy law,
which vary with the type of bankruptcy case. The following analysis focuses
on the two types of cases-consumer (section 4.1) and corporate Chapter 11
(4.2)-where the implications of the "'disappearing trial" are fairly clear.

A.

CONSUMER CASES

Our data show that adversary proceedings in consumer cases are virtually
synonymous with objections to discharge under § 727 and complaints that
particular debts are nondischargeable under § 523. The longstanding policy
of the bankruptcy laws is to give the honest but unfortunate individual who
is hopelessly in debt the right to a fresh start. 56 All the evidence suggests
that the overwhelming majority of those who file individual bankruptcy peti,
tions are in fact entitled to a fresh start. 57 Hence, we should expect the num,
ber of adversary proceedings in individual Chapter 7 cases to be small and
virtually nonexistent in Chapter 13. 58 When the individual debtor's right to
a fresh start is not in dispute (and, at least under existing law, it rarely is),
there is nothing to have a trial about. 59
Against this backdrop, an apparent decline in the number of adversary
proceedings in consumer cases is not a cause for concern. To the contrary, it
suggests that bankruptcy abuse, far from being on the rise, is falling. If the
dramatic rise in the filing rate brought into the system more debtors who
were not entitled to a discharge, the number of adversary proceedings should
have gone up, everything else equal. 60 One cannot, of course, support this
thesis merely by looking at the numbers. As we noted in Section 1, the bank,
ruptcy process has become sufficiently predictable that few adversary pro,
ceedings need to be filed and those that are filed never go to trial (when an
adversary is filed, its outcome is clear). Indeed, it is theoretically possible that
abuse has increased and, absent such an increase, the greater predictability of
the process would have led to an even greater decline. But there is no evi,
dence to support this hypothesis. In short, nothing suggests anything is amiss
56

See, e.g., Local Loan v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
generally TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ET AL., As WE FORGIVE OuR DEBTORS (1999).
58
Chapter 13 gives a broader discharge than Chapter 7. With fewer opportunities to object to discharge, we should expect fewer adversary proceedings in Chapter 13. In our sample of 150 cases, we found
none. A larger sample might produce some. And as the broad discharge in Chapter 13 is cut back over
time, the total number may increase.
59 Interestingly, we find the same patterns (few adversary proceedings, but all of them addressing
nondischargeability issues) in business Chapter 7 filings by individuals.
60
Adversary proceedings might not have increased if the U.S. Trustee became much more vigorous in
seeking dismissal under § 707(b), but we have no evidence of this either.
57 See
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with respect to adversary proceedings in consumer bankruptcy cases. The
vanishing trial is not cause for concern.

B.

CORPORA TE CHAPTER

11

CASES

Corporate Chapter 11 cases can be evaluated along at least two dimen,
sions: (1) the effectiveness of the system in ensuring that viable businesses
survive and others are swiftly liquidated, and (2) the system's effectiveness in
vindicating the rights of creditors, especially unsecured creditors, and provid,
ing them with a recovery on their claims.
1. Distinguishing Viable and N_on-Viable Businesses

Adversaries are exceedingly rare in cases that get dismissed, but this is to
be expected. As noted above, cases are often dismissed precisely because the
debtor business has insufficient assets to justify the expense of the bank,
ruptcy process, including adversary proceedings. 61 Beyond this, there is little
or no correlation between Chapter 11 outcomes and the incidence of adver,
sary proceedings. Adversaries are about as common in cases leading to reorganization (30%) as they are in cases converted to Chapter 7 (26%). Closer
analysis of the data leads to the same conclusions: in regressions not reported
here, we found no correlation between bankruptcy outcomes and the inci,
dence of adversary proceedings.
This should be unsurprising. The most important issues in adversary proceedings (avoidance of preferences and fraudulent transfers) have little bear,
ing on the most important issue in a Chapter 11 case (whether the business is
viable). Indeed, most adversaries in our sample were brought by a creditors'
committee or trustee after the fate of the business had been decided (after a
plan had been confirmed or the case converted to Chapter 7). And again,
adversary proceedings are rare. They are altogether absent in the vast major,
ity of corporate Chapter l ls. If anything, the absence of adversary proceed,
ings provides further evidence supporting what we already know about
Chapter 11. It is a highly expeditious procedure for resolving the financial
distress of businesses and their owner-managers.
The typical corporate case involves a small business owned, operated, and
inextricably tied to a single person, such as an electrical subcontractor, a
travel agency, or a small restaurant. 62 The corporate Chapter 11 process of,
fers no fresh start for the owner-manager. Nevertheless, her personal finan,
cial affairs are caught up in the affairs of the corporation. In 85% of the cases,
the owner-manager is personally liable for the debts of the corporation.63 In
61
But even this pattern is less clear than it seems. About 10% of all dismissals involve businesses that
cut deals with major creditors, voluntarily moved to dismiss their petitions, and continued operations
outside of bankruptcy. See Morrison, supra note 7 (manuscript at 51 tab. 4, on file with authors).
62
See generally Baird and Morrison, supra note 7.
63
/d., at 2362 tab. 17.
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more than 60% of small corporate Chapter 11 reorganizations, the case cen,
ters around the tax obligations of the corporation that are also the personal
obligations of the owner,manager. 64 She keeps the business afloat temporarily
by using money withheld from paychecks and earmarked for the Internal
Revenue Service to keep suppliers, landlords, and others at bay. The Chapter
11 case consists of negotiations in which the owner-manager tries to keep the
business alive while at the same time trying to escape personal liability for
these personal obligations. 65
Regardless of why the owner-manager of a financially distressed small
business has decided to use Chapter 11, the bankruptcy judge faces the chal,
lenge of distinguishing between the businesses that can survive as going con,
cerns and those that cannot. If a business is to survive, the sorting process
should be done quickly. And it is done quickly. Among businesses that are
continued, nearly two-thirds exit in less than one year. 66 More surprisingly,
the Chapter 11 process identifies over 70% of all non-viable businesses
within six months; 44% are identified within three months. Only 8.5% of
cases are still ongoing after one year. Complaints about the unwillingness of
judges to do their jobs and act decisively have no place here.
In short, the Northern District of Illinois data show that judges exercise
control over a process that works well without ordinary civil litigation. In,
deed, by any measure it works quickly. The Northern District permits the
parties to a case to schedule motions (e.g., a debtor's motion to use cash col,
lateral, a creditor's motion to lift the automatic stay). The typical judge sets a
time each week to hear motions on any Chapter 11 case on her docket. A
party can file a motion on Thursday, give the required notice, and ask to raise
the matter at the regularly scheduled time for Chapter 11 motions the next
Tuesday. 67 Opposing lawyers need not draft a response. They simply attend
the hearing and present argument orally to the judge. As a result, the judge's
decision will be based not only on the paper record, but also on open-ended
discussion with the parties in open court. Judges typically rule on the spot. 68
Relative to ordinary civil litigation, the typical bankruptcy matter in the
64Jd.
65
There are also cases in which the debtor needs to sort out claims of a landlord, a former employee, or
some other third party. In one case, for example, the Chapter 11 was brought to stay an employment
discrimination action that was just about to go to trial. In re Myron & Phil"s Steakhouse, No. 98-726
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. Jan. 12, 1998). In these cases too, however, the Chapter 11 is used to resolve a discrete
problem.
66
The observations in this paragraph are based on Morrison, supra note 7 (manuscript at D-14, on file
with the authors).
67When there is personal service, only two-days notice is required. Bankr. N.D. Ill. R. 9013-1-9013-9
(the notice period is enlarged to 20 days for motions proposing the sale of assets outside the ordinary
course, conversion to Chapter 7 or dismissal, and other significant events; see Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2002).
68
Interview with Chief Judge Eugene R. Wedoff, United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern
District of Illinois (Dec. 3, 2002). See also Judge John Q. Squires' description of the practice, John Q.
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Northern District moves at the_ speed of light. 69
The sorting process is not only quick; it is also accurate. Viable busi,
nesses are saved; failures are shut down. In cases leading to shutdown, nearly
80% of the businesses exhibited some indicator of "economic" distress, such as
failing to pay ongoing expenses in bankruptcy or violating court procedures. 70
These indicators characterize businesses without prospects, rather than busi,
nesses suffering from temporary reverses. By contrast, 71 % of businesses that
were reorganized exhibited classic indicators of "financial," not economic, dis,
tress. Forty percent were recovering from overexpansion. Notably, in only
one of these overexpansion cases did the business fail after reorganizing. An,
other 9% suffered temporary cash shortages from the loss of customers (who
had gone bankrupt or breached contracts), and about 11 % of the businesses
suffered temporary cash shortages because they had underestimated the costs
of reconfiguring assets (e.g., converting a restaurant to a lounge). Among busi,
nesses that exited bankruptcy with a with a new capital structure, less than
22% failed within one year and less than 37% within two years. Given that
the annual probability of discontinuing a business is around 20% even for
businesses over ten years old,7 1 nothing in the data here implies that the
Chapter 11 process erroneously reorganized any of the businesses that sur,
vived more than one or two years.
To the extent that procedure matters, we should not be bound by the
conventional paradigms of civil litigation. The absence of adversary proceed,
ings-or anything else resembling the tradition civil trial-gives us no reason
to doubt the efficacy of the bankruptcy process in quickly identifying busi,
nesses that cannot succeed and allowing those that can to reorganize. Far
from being a pathology of modern adjudication, the process harkens back to
the piepowder courts and the venerable law merchant strand of the common
law tradition.72

Squires, Fifteen Common Banl{ruptcy Practice Errors and How to Avoid Them, DCBA BRIEF ONLINE, Jun.
1998, available at http:/ /www.dcba.org/brief/judpractice/0698.htm (visited July 6, 2005).
69
Other bankruptcy courts may be less effective, as this motions practice is distinctive. In other jurisdictions, motions are filed with the court clerk. Opportunity is given for opposing counsel to draft a
response, and the judge often renders a decision without conducting a hearing. Weeks or months can pass
before a motion is considered. For a discussion of these procedures and their likely effect on the overall
efficiency of Chapter 11 practice, see Morrison, supra note 7.
70The observations in this and the following paragraph are based on Morrison, supra note 7 (manuscript at 18-20, on file with authors).
71
Thomas J. Holmes and James A. Schmitz, On the T umover of Business Firms and Business Managers,
103 J. POL. ECON. 1005 (1995).
72 See, e.g., Charles Gross, The Court of Piepowder, 20 QUART.]. EcoN. 231 (1906) ("A striking feature
of the court of piepowder was its summary procedure .... Formalitir~ were avoided ... and an answer to
the summons was expected within a day, often indeed within an hour.~).
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2. Creditors
Bankruptcy is supposed to promote goals in addition to reorganization.
Many accounts of Chapter 11 reorganizations assume that its beneficiaries
should include general creditors. That is, one of bankruptcy's goals is distributional. In the typical Chapter 11, however, general creditors end up with
nothing. 73 After secured creditors are paid and administrative expenses covered, tax claims typically exhaust whatever is left.7 4 Only in the largest cases
can general creditors expect a significant recovery. While this outcome may
be troubling, the problem has little to do with the relative absence of anything resembling traditional litigation. Litigation cannot create assets where
none exist.
The absence of adversary proceedings is troubling in one respect, however. In addition to enabling viable businesses to survive, bankruptcy also
prohibits debtors from favoring some creditors over others when bankruptcy
is looming. Moreover, an effective bankruptcy law should also ensure recovery of fraudulent transfers for the benefit of the creditors as a group. In the
typical small business bankruptcy, however, no trustee is appointed. The old
managers act as debtor-in-possession and assume the powers and duties of the
trustee, including the bringing of avoidance actions. As a practical matter,
the debtor in possession rarely brings them. It wants to reorganize and has
no incentive to go after money paid to someone favored before the bank,
ruptcy petition was filed. Indeed, those whom the debtor favored are especially likely to be those with whom she wants to continue to do business.
The debtor in possession might bring an avoidance action if prodded by
the creditors' committee or a particular creditor, but in the typical small business Chapter 11 there is no active creditors' committee and no creditor is
likely to push for it either. In general, there is not going to be a distribution
to the general creditors. Spending time and incurring the costs of serving on
a committee of unsecured creditors is usually a waste of time. To be sure,
one creditor might have a dominant role in the reorganization. But that cred73

See Baird et al., supra note 7, at 24.
are, of course, exceptions. Now and again a solvent debtor will use the bankruptcy process to
sort out a lawsuit. Our sample included a restaurant that filed for bankruptcy a few minutes after a sexual
harassment/ age discrimination trial brought by a former employee went to trial. The Chapter 11 lasted
only as long as it took to negotiate a settlement with this employee and another who had brought a race
discrimination action. See Baird & Morrison, supra note 7, at 2353. Alternatively, the debtor's fortunes
may take an unexpected turn for the better. One distressed business in our sample, another restaurant,
discovered that its leasehold interest was valuable. The landlord wanted to sell the real estate to a third
party, but the buyer refused to go through with the transaction unless the restaurant surrendered posses•
sion of the premises. By filing for bankruptcy and curing defaults, the restaurant ensured that it could share
in the premium that the landlord obtained from the sale. Id., at 2354. But these cases are unusual. If we
focus on the typical debtor (in other words, if we look at the median statistics in aggregate data), the
current process is not one that can be justified on the ground that it better protects the general creditor
than the alternatives. Neither is likely to yield them anything.
74 There
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itor likely had power before the bankruptcy and would either have received
the preference or blessed it. The United States Trustee might identify a
preference and pressure the debtor in possession to bring the action, but
rarely will the stakes be large enough. The burden of litigating various issues
(including whether the payment was made in ordinary course) may not justify the costs. Nevertheless, the nature of the typical debtor's financesshowing an invasion of trust funds used to pay taxes-strongly suggests
many preference and other voidable transfers did in fact occur.
The current system, then, seems to favor reorganization at the expense of
vindicating the bankruptcy norm of equality among general creditors and, in
particular, its policy against voidable preferences. The debtor-in-possession
concept is central to vindicating the first, but antithetical to vindicating the
latter. Such a trade-off may be inevitable. The typical small business will not
continue without the current owner-manager in place, and the current
owner-manager is not going to bring preference actions.

CONCLUSION
Modern bankruptcy practice is not a story about vanishing trials at all.
Bankruptcy's adversary proceeding, while resembling the civil trial, is a small
part of the bankruptcy process and over most dimensions tells us comparatively little about the system and how it functions. It is a sideshow. Moreover, adversary proceedings have not changed in important ways over the
years. The overall picture, however, does reinforce the message that emerges
when viewing the data from other vantage points. Honest but unlucky individuals are getdng their fresh start. Viable businesses are able to reorganize.
Nonviable businesses are quickly identified. The system is working as intended. The vanishing trial raises fundamental issues about federal civil litigation, but not about bankruptcy judges or the legal institution they administer
so ably.

